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This paper applies the theoretical literature on nonparametric bounds on treatment 
effects to the estimation of how limited English proficiency (LEP) affects wages 
and employment opportunities for Hispanic workers in the United States. I 
analyze the identifying power of several weak assumptions on treatment response 
and selection, and stress the interactions between LEP and education, occupation 
and immigration status. I show that the combination of two weak but credible 
assumptions provides informative upper bounds on the returns to language skills 
for certain subgroups of the population. Adding age at arrival as a monotone 
instrumental variable also provides informative lower bounds. 
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1. Introduction 
Hispanics reached 13.3 percent of the total population in the United States in 2002 (37.4 
million).
1 Hispanic workers earn less than Non-Hispanic Whites and are more likely to be 
unemployed. This has been attributed to assimilation problems for immigrants (2 in 5 
Hispanics were foreign born in 2002), low levels of schooling (more than 2 in 5 Hispanics 
aged 25 and older had not graduated from high school), discrimination, and limited English 
proficiency (almost 1 in 3 Hispanics admitted speaking English less than “very well”). This 
paper explores the role of limited language skills in explaining wages and unemployment 
for Hispanic workers in the US. From a policy perspective, we may be interested in 
learning whether, and by how much, investing in language acquisition would help labor 
market outcomes for Hispanics converge to those of Non-Whites.2  
Previous studies have estimated the effect of language skills on earnings through OLS 
regressions.
3 Concerns about a possible “ability bias” led some to incorporating IV 
estimates,
4 but these results tend to be unstable or implausibly large, and the credibility of 
the instruments is often questionable. The size of reported OLS and IV estimates varies 
considerably across studies and methods.  
                                                 
1 Ramirez and De la Cruz 2003. 
2 In this paper I focus on how English proficiency translates into labor market outcomes. In terms of policy, 
we would also be interested in learning how language training translates into the actual mastery of the 
language. This is outside the scope of this paper. For a study of the determinants of language proficiency see, 
for example, Chiswick and Miller (1995). 
3 For example, see Reimers 1983, McManus, Gould and Welch 1983, Grenier 1984, McManus 1985, Carliner 
1996. 
4 For example, see Chiswick and Miller 1995 or Bleakley and Chin 2002.   2 
I propose a “conservative” approach in the spirit of Manski (Manski 1990, 1995, 1997, 
Manski and Pepper 2000), according to which a worst-case analysis would precede the 
study of alternative weak assumptions and their identifying power. Through the 
introduction of weak but credible assumptions, I provide identification regions for the 
effects under consideration, so that any point estimates obtained under stronger 
assumptions should lie within these regions. The results are informative, in the sense that 
the upper bounds provided are lower than some point estimates reported in previous 
studies. 
The assumptions I explore include monotone treatment response, as introduced by 
Manski (1997), and monotone instrumental variables, in the sense of Manski and Pepper 
(2000). I also stress the interactions between LEP and education, occupation and years of 
residence in the U.S., and study the possibility of positive sorting into treatments. 
All the assumptions considered are informative, i n the sense that they improve the 
identification problem with respect to the worst-case situation in which no prior 
information is available. However, only when we assume positive selection into treatments 
(MTS) and a monotone response function (MTR) do we get bounds narrow enough to be 
interesting. The lower bound for the effect of LEP when only MTR and MTS are imposed 
is always zero, and the upper bound is slightly higher than the estimate obtained when 
assuming that selection into treatments is random (as in OLS). I also propose the use of 
immigrants’ age at arrival in the US as a monotone instrumental variable (MIV). This 
assumption reduces the MTR+MTS bounds by raising the lower bounds above zero.    3 
Once we introduce covariates, MTR+MTS is rejected in some cases, such as low 
educated workers, allowing us to reject the presence of ability bias or even that treatments 
are assigned at random.  
The bounds also rule out large effects for the later stages of language acquisition and 
for certain occupations. Improving EP from “well” to “very well” would lead to an average 
increase in wages no larger than 12.6 percent. Workers in agricultural occupations would 
experience a wage increase of no more than 6.7 percent when improving their English 
proficiency from “not at all” to “very well”, and that would reduce their unemployment 
probability by no more than 0.3 percentage points. For service workers, the overall wage 
premium would be no higher than 17.4 percent. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly review the 
literature on the labor market effects of LEP. Section 3 analyzes the effect of English 
proficiency on earnings and unemployment rates. I first introduce the data sources and the 
variables included in the analysis. Some informative conclusions are then reached by 
exploring the identifying power of different assumptions. Section 4 summarizes the 
findings.  
   
2. Literature On The Labor Market Returns to Language Skills 
 
In 2000, 47 million respondents to the U.S. Census of Population reported that they spoke a 
language other than English at home, and for 60 percent of them this language was Spanish. 
Moreover, 49 percent of those who spoke Spanish at home admitted to some deficiencies in   4 
their mastery of English. Poor mastery of English has the potential for harming labor 
market outcomes in an environment where that is the main language in which 
communication takes place. Several theoretical explanations for this intuitive fact have 
been attempted. For McManus et al. (1983) and McManus (1985), the extent of the 
earnings loss caused by English deficiency depends both on the nature of production 
(integrated vs. non-integrated) and on the nature of the product (personal vs. impersonal).  
Language proficiency is viewed in the economics literature as a form of human capital. 
Grenier (1984), for example, states: “ people invest in language for the same reasons that 
they invest in education and other kinds of human capital –that is, in order to maximize the 
present value of expected net returns”. For Chiswick and Miller (1995), “Language skills 
are an important form of human capital. They satisfy the three basic requirements for 
human capital: they are embodied in the person; they are productive in the labor market 
and or in consumption; and t hey are created at a sacrifice of time and out-of-pocket 
resources”. 
The standard approach to estimating the effect of language proficiency on earnings is to 
include some index of English proficiency (EP) in an earnings regression, together with 
other covariates such as education, experience, and years of residence in the country. The 
first US survey with detailed questions on EP was the 1976 Survey of Income and 
Education. Several studies in the early 1980s used this data set to produce a first set of 
estimates of the effect of EP on earnings. Reimers (1983) used a binary variable indicating 
English fluency, and found significant effects (18 to 20%) of LEP on wages for Puerto 
Ricans and other Hispanics. Grenier (1984) found effects of around 15%, concluding that   5 
language completely explains the wage gap between Hispanics and whites. McManus et 
alia (1983) and McManus (1985) found that the effects of EP on wages increase with 
schooling and experience, and found higher penalties to LEP in more skilled occupations. 
McManus (1985) concluded that raising EP to perfect fluency would increase wages by 
26% on average. Kossoudji (1988) focused on the simultaneity of the occupation and EP 
decisions, concluding that LEP reduces earnings in all occupations, with penalties as high 
as 66% or 30% for certain occupations.  
These early studies, however, do not address the possibility that EP and earnings may 
be correlated simply because more able workers are more likely to speak English and to 
earn more. If there is a correlation between EP and unmeasured ability, then OLS yields 
biased estimates. Chiswick and Miller (1995) use IV analysis to correct for this 
endogeneity, but their results are "unstable" and the validity of their instruments is 
questionable. Using the 1980 Census, their OLS estimate of the effect of EP on earnings is 
17%, which increases to 57% with the IV analysis. Bleakley and Chin (2002) also propose 
an IV approach.
5 Their analysis, with data from the 1990 Census, concludes that the IV 
estimate is greater in magnitude than the OLS one. They provide evidence that the OLS 
estimate is slightly biased upwards due to the endogeneity of language skills, but 
substantially biased downward due to measurement error. 
Other recent papers have used the pooled 1980 and 1990 US Censuses in their analyses. 
Mora and Davila (1998) focus on the different penalties imposed by LEP by gender and 
                                                 
5 They use immigrants’ age at arrival interacted with country of origin as an instrument for English 
proficiency.   6 
education, and Carliner (1996) estimates an average wage penalty of 21% for men and 9% 
for women, but the estimates are higher for educated workers. He concludes that the rate of 
return to moving from no EP to perfect fluency is roughly equal to the rate of return from 
four years of education.  
Berman et alia (2000) provide a different approach to separating language acquisition 
effects from ability bias. With a data set
6 that documents the change in immigrants' 
earnings as well as in language fluency, they are able to introduce individual fixed-effects 
in the regressions, which they interpret as "ability". They estimate a 26% effect of language 
fluency on earnings in the cross-section regression, which is reduced to 23% when 
including the fixed-effects. However, disaggregating by occupation shows that the returns 
to language proficiency are much higher in high skill occupations, and they are n ot 
significantly reduced when introducing fixed effects, while the effects are smaller in low 
skill occupations, and they turn insignificant in the fixed-effects specifications. This leads 
them to conclude that improved language fluency only affects wages for high skill workers, 
and the estimated effects for low skill workers can be entirely attributed to ability bias. 
Different studies provide estimates of the effect of language skills on earnings that 
range from 10 percent to more than 100 percent in some IV estimates.
7 This paper intends 
to provide a framework for consensus; an identification region obtained under weak but 
                                                 
6 Their data refers to Russian immigrants in Israel. 
7 Bleakley and Chin (2002) find that improving EP by one unit (for example, from “well” to “very well”) 
increases wages by 33.3 percent (before controlling for education), implying a 100 percent overall effect 
(from “not at all” to “very well”).   7 
credible assumptions, so that any point estimates obtained under stronger assumptions 
should lie within these regions.  
The analysis explicitly addresses the suspected correlation between unobserved ability 
and language fluency, and the possibility of inter-individual variation in the returns to 
language fluency. Most previous studies that estimate varying returns to EP across different 
values of covariates such as education rely on the assumption of exogenous sorting.
8 Once 
we relax this assumption, the evidence does not support many of those results.      
 
3. English Proficiency, Wages and Unemployment 
3.1   The Data and Variables 
I define the  population J as “Hispanics 16 to 64 years old in the U.S. in 1989”. Each 
member j of the population has some covariates x j ˛ X (education, experience, etc), and 
they receive treatments t ˛ T that correspond to their English proficiency. The possible 
treatments are five:
9 t 5 (speaks only English at home); t 4 (speaks English very well); t 3 
(well); t2 (not well); t1 (not at all). The response functions y j(.): T ﬁ Y and uj(.): T ﬁ U 
map treatments into outcomes. The two outcomes are earnings
10 and employment status. 
The realized outcome y j ” y j(zj) is the actual level of earnings (or unemployment rate) for 
an individual who actually received treatment zj. The latent outcomes yj(t), t „ z tell us what 
                                                 
8 See McManus et al. (1983), McManus (1985), Carliner (1996). 
9 The Census Questionnaire asks everyone whether they speak any language other than English at home. If 
they do, then they have to answer the question of English proficiency. Most previous studies assumed that 
Hispanics that reportedly speak only English at home could be considered perfectly fluent in English. 
10 I will refer to y as “earnings”, but I will actually be using the natural logarithm of hourly wages.   8 
individual j would have earned if she had received treatment t. Similarly, the realized 
outcome u j”uj(zj) is the actual unemployment rate among the individuals receiving a 
particular treatment, while the latent outcomes u j(t), t „z tell us the probability of being 
unemployed that an individual would face if she were to receive a different treatment.  
  We are interested in learning about “average treatment effects”, i.e., we seek bounds on 
the differences: E[y(ti)]-E[y(tj)] and P[u(ti)]- P[u(tj)], for ti, tj ˛ T, ti „ tj. For example, this 
would answer the question: what would the average increase in earnings be if all the 
population moved from proficiency level j to i, i>j? This is an application of classical 
treatment analysis, which compares what happens when treating everyone in the population 
with treatment s versus  treating everyone with treatment t. Of course, we are facing a 
censoring problem, because we don’t observe the wage that everyone would earn if all of 
them were to receive one particular treatment. We only observe the earnings (and 
unemployment rates) corresponding to actual treatments. To see this, we can decompose 
E[y(t)] using the law of total probability:  
E[y(t)]=E[y(t)|z=t] P(z=t) + E[y(t)|z„t] P(z„t)            (1) 
The sampling process identifies E[y(t)|z=t],  P(z=t) and P(z„t), but doesn’t give us any 
information about E[y(t)|z„t]. Here is where the researcher must impose assumptions in 
order to get identification. To start, we must specify a logical range for E[y(t)].
11 In 1990, 
the minimum (hourly) wage was fixed at $3.80. This corresponds to a log hourly wage of 
1.335. Because there are some observations in the sample that go below this level, I choose 
                                                 
11 Otherwise the bounds will not be informative at all, given that expectations can range from  ¥ - to + ¥ .   9 
the value K0=1 as the infimum for y. For an upper limit I choose K1=5, which corresponds 
to an hourly wage of $150 (more than 99% of the observed wages are lower than $55). I 
will also report the bounds obtained by choosing alternative values of [K0, K1]. 
  As for the employment outcomes, we are interested in learning about P[u(t)], i.e., the 
unemployment rate for a given treatment. This probability can be decomposed as in 
equation (1): 
  P[u(t)] = P[u(t)|z=t] P(z=t) + P[u(t)|z„t] P(z„t).           (2) 
Assumptions must be imposed on P[u(t)|z„t] in order to get identification. One advantage 
from dealing with probabilities instead of expectations is that we don’t need to impose a 
range on P[u(t)], since we know it necessarily belongs to [0,1]. 
I construct my sample from the 1990 1% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) for all 
50 states. I consider all persons reporting a Hispanic origin12, aged 16 to 64. The sample 
size is 117,998. In the analysis of earnings, I drop from the sample those who report zero 
earnings, zero usual hours worked per week, or zero weeks worked
13. The final sample for 
earnings has 82,250 observations.
14 The outcome variable y j, is the natural log of hourly 
wage, which I calculate with the following information: weeks worked last year, usual 
hours worked per week last year and wages or salary income in 1989. The employment 
status variable takes three possible values: employed, unemployed, and out of the labor 
                                                 
12 I count every individual who reported any “Hispanic” category when asked about his/her first ancestry. 
13 Keeping females in the sample introduces an additional censoring problem due to lower participation rates, 
as we do not observe the wages of women out of the labor force. This could potentially bias our results. I do 
not explicitly model this source of censoring, thus implicitly assuming that, conditioning on the treatment and 
the covariates, expected wages are the same for women actually working and those out of the labor force. 
Excluding women from the sample does not however change the main results significantly (see section 3.2.5). 
14 A potential problem with this sample may arise because of illegal immigrants and the way they are counted 
and report their labor market status. However, there’s no obvious way around this problem.   10 
force. The data on treatments received come from the answer to the question on “ability to 
speak English”. It is important to realize the qualitative character of the EP variable. First, it 
is a merely ordinal variable; we can’t quantify what speaking English “well” means, so it’s 
impossible to talk about “distance” between treatments
15. Moreover, there’s some degree of 
subjectivity implicit in this variable, which opens the door to measurement error 
problems.
16 I admit this deficiency of the EP measure and the convenience of a better 
indicator of EP (like the scores on some official test), less subjective and easier to quantify. 
In absence of such a variable, the best we can do is be aware of these weaknesses, and 
respect the discrete, ordinal character of our EP variable. 
Observed (log) hourly wages are distributed symmetrically around an average of 2 and 
with a standard deviation of 0.64. More than 99% of the observations lie in the interval 
[0,4]. Observed wages are clearly increasing in EP, in a merely descriptive sense: people 
who speak better English earn higher wages, on average (see table 1). Seven percent of the 
individuals in the sample don't speak English at all, while almost 20 percent speak only 
English. Treatments t2, t3 and t4 are received by 15, 18 and 41 percent of the individuals in 
the sample, respectively. Hispanics with better mastery of English tend to be better 
educated (average years of education increase with t, from 6 to 12.3). On the other hand, 
experience shows a very pronounced decreasing trend, declining from 22.9 years for 
                                                 
15 Although many previous studies do so (see, for example, Mora and Davila 1998 and Berman et. al. 2000). 
16 Dustmann and Van Soest (2000) address the consequences of using self-reported measures of language 
proficiency, which may contain substantial reporting errors. They decompose misclassification errors into a 
time-persistent and a time-varying component, using panel data. They find that this type of reporting error can 
have important consequences for the estimated effect of speaking fluency on earnings. Unfortunately, the 
cross-sectional nature of my data set does not allow for this type of analysis.   11 
treatment t 1 to 13.3 years for t 5. Table 1 also shows the proportion of foreign-born and 
Mexican ancestry for each treatment group. 
Observed unemployment rates clearly decrease with EP (see table 2). The 
unemployment rate is 15.8 percent for Hispanics who don’t speak English at all, while only 
8.6 percent of those who speak English at home are unemployed. The proportion of people 
out of the labor force is also decreasing in EP level. The total difference is 12 percentage 
points (37 percent for t1 against 25 percent for t5). Thus, there's reason to suspect that low 
wages are not the only penalty imposed by the labor market to Hispanics with a low ability 
to communicate in English. They also seem to suffer higher unemployment rates, and 
remain out of the labor force with a higher probability.
17   
 
3.2 Exploring the Identifying Power of Different Assumptions 
How does English proficiency affect earnings and employment opportunities for Hispanic 
workers? I start by estimating worst-case bounds, and then explore the identifying power of 
alternative assumptions. I will focus on the results obtained when combining the 
assumption that treatment response is monotone and that selection into treatments is 
positive.
18  
If expected log hourly wages belong to [K0, K1], then, from equation (1), we must have: 
E[y(ti)|z=ti] P(z=ti) + K0 P(z„ti) £ E[y(t)] £ E[y(ti)|z=ti] P(z=ti) + K1 P(z„ti)    (3)                                        
                                                 
17 I do not include the analysis of how LEP affects the probability of staying out of the labor force because the 
trends there seem to be driven by females.   
18 I will spend more time describing the bounds for earnings, but the ones for unemployment are calculated in 
a parallel fashion. 
    12 
The worst-case bounds for E[y(t)] for each of the treatments are shown in table 3. A priori, 
E[y(t)] can range from 1 to 5. We can see how the worst-case bounds already restrict this 
interval. The worst-case bounds for unemployment rates can be calculated analogously, and 
are shown in table 5. 
3.2.1 Assumptions on Response Functions 
These assumptions refer to y j(ti) and uj(ti), i.e., the individual functions mapping treatments 
into outcomes. The most usual is the “linear response assumption”, which imposes y j(ti) = a 
+ bt + ej. This assumption is not applicable in this case, due to the ordinal character of the 
treatment variable. Instead, I will explore the implications of assuming monotone treatment 
response (MTR). This assumption is specified as follows: 
ti+1 > ti  ﬁ  yj(ti+1) ‡ yj(ti)                 (4) 
This assumption means that, ceteris paribus, response varies monotonically with treatment. 
In our particular case, it implies that improving someone’s EP cannot lower her wage (or 
her probability of finding a job), i.e., that each person’s wage (employment) function is 
weakly increasing in conjectured EP. This assumption is drawn from the human capital 
approach, which implies that EP is potentially productive in the labor market. Note that 
assuming MTR does not exclude the possibility of EP being not productive at all.  
This weak assumption can narrow the worst-case bounds, since it implies that 
E[y(tj)|z=tk] ‡ E[y(ti)|z=tk], for any k and any j>i. Adding this new restriction to (3), the 
resulting bounds are calculated according to the following expression (see M anski (1997) 
for a full derivation of the formula):   13 
K0 P(z>ti) + E[y(ti)|z £ ti] P(z £ ti)  £  E[y(ti)]  £            (5) 
£  K1 P(z<ti) + E[y(ti)|z ‡ ti] P(z ‡ ti)         
 
These bounds can be found in table 3. I also calculate confidence intervals using the 
percentile bootstrap method. This assumption alone is already informative, in the sense that 
it narrows the worst-case bounds considerably. Without making additional assumptions 
about treatment selection, MTR allows us to say that the expected log wage for workers 
who don’t speak English at all lies between 1.05 and 1.98, while for workers who speak 
English very well this expectation is between 1.77 and 3.22. The MTR bounds for 
unemployment and the corresponding bootstrap confidence intervals can be found in table 
5. 
3.2.2 Assumptions on Treatment Selection 
These assumptions refer to sorting, i.e., to the process that determines the way treatments 
are assigned to different individuals in the population.  
Exogenous Treatment Selection (ETS) 
The usual method when dealing with this question is to assume exogenous treatment 
selection.
19 This implies that treatments are assigned randomly to the population, and can 
be expressed formally as: 
E[y(t)|x,z] = E[y(t)|x]                  (6)
         
                                                 
19 ETS is implicitly assumed in Reimers 1983, McManus, Gould and Welch 1983, Grenier 1984, McManus 
1985, Carliner 1996, etc.    14 
This assumption is implied in OLS analyses, but it does not seem appropriate in our case.  
Individuals receiving different treatments differ substantially from one another, possibly in 
unobservable dimensions as well as in terms of the observed covariates. However, one 
advantage of assuming ETS is that it always yields point identification, which probably 
accounts for its widespread use. The ETS estimates are equivalent to the coefficients 
obtained by running OLS on earnings with one dummy variable for each EP level and no 
other covariates20. The results of the OLS analysis can be seen in table 6. The estimated 
increase in earnings derived from moving from treatment 1 to 4 is 37.8 percent. I also 
present the results obtained when conditioning on several covariates, with results that 
replicate those obtained in previous studies.
21 After including the full set of controls, the 
estimated effect of moving from treatment 1 to 4 is 12.6 percent. As for the employment 
outcome, the estimated decrease in the probability of being unemployed derived from 
moving from treatment 1 to 4 under ETS is 6.3 percentage points (see table 5).22   
 
                                                 
20 For examples of this approach, see Carliner (1995) and Lazear (1998). They transform the EP variable into 
a binary treatment, which is then introduced into a regression as a dummy.   
21  Education and experience show a significant positive effect on earnings, with coefficients of 0.05 and 
0.015, respectively. Gender (a dummy variable for females) is significantly negative. The coefficients on the 
dummy for US born vs. immigrant and years of residence are consistent with the results suggested by the 
literature on immigration. The coefficient on the variable “US born” reflects the percent wage differential 
between natives and immigrants at the time of arrival of the latter. The positive sign indicates that native 
Hispanics earn more than immigrants at the time of their arrival to this country. The coefficient on the 
variable “years of residence” is the rate at which earnings of immigrants rise relative to natives. This 
coefficient is significantly positive, i.e., wages of immigrants appear to rise faster than those of natives. In 
particular, one more year of residence in the US for an immigrant increases the wage in about 0.4%. I also 
introduce dummies for ancestry and occupation. After conditioning on all the covariates, moving from t1 to t2 
increases earnings in an estimated 3%. This percentage is 8% from t1 to t3; 12.6% from t1 to t4; and 19% from 
t1 to t5.   
22 The same result could be obtained by estimating a Probit model including observations only for individuals 
actually receiving treatments 1 and 4, and a dummy variable indicating treatment 4 as the only covariate.    15 
Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS) 
If we suspect that sorting into treatment is not exogenous, then a natural alternative to ETS 
would be to assume that selection into treatments is monotone. This assumption can be 
defined for earnings as follows: 
tj > ti  ﬁ E[y(tk)|x,z=tj] ‡ E[y(tk)|x,z=ti]             (7) 
This implies that workers with higher EP have weakly higher mean wage functions than 
people with lower EP. Human capital accumulation theory predicts that persons with higher 
ability have higher mean wage functions and acquire more human capital than do persons 
with lower ability. If language proficiency is a form of human capital, then MTS is an 
implication of this type of model. Many previous studies
23 show concerns that persons with 
higher ability have higher mean wage functions and speak better English than do persons 
with lower ability. Some studies have tried to correct for this endogeneity in the framework 
of a linear model, mainly by using instrumental variables. However, these attempts haven't 
been convincing. The MTS assumption is a natural way of incorporating this possibility, 
avoiding the limitations of IV assumptions.
24 The new bounds can be derived from 
inequality (3) by adding the new restrictions implied by MTS, and the final expression is 
the following (see Manski and Pepper (2000) for the full derivation): 
K0 P(z < t) + E[y(t)|z=t] P(z ‡ t) £ E[y(t)] £ K1 P(z > t) + E[y(t)|z=t] P(z £ t).         (8) 
                                                 
23 Borjas 1991, Chiswick & Miller 1995, Berman et al. 2000. 
24 The validity of an instrument is usually hard to justify and can compromise the credibility of the results. 
Assuming MTS incorporates the concerns about selection and, although weaker than IV in terms of 
identification power, does so without compromising credibility.    16 
The resulting bounds and the confidence intervals are reported in table 3. Note that this 
assumption narrows the expected wage for treatments t 4 and t 5 considerably, but its 
identifying power is weak for the rest of the treatments.  
As for unemployment, MTS implies that more able individuals are more likely to speak 
English and to be employed. The bounds derived from imposing MTS are shown in table 5.   
Monotone Instrumental Variables (MIV) 
A traditional way of approaching the selection problem in the literature is to make use of 
instrumental variables (IV). An instrumental variable v is assumed to satisfy mean-
independence across specified sub-populations:  
E[y(t)|x,v=u2] = E[y(t)|x,v=u1],    u1 „ u2            (9) 
It is usually a problem to find good instruments. For example, Bleakley and Chin (2002) 
propose using immigrants’ age at arrival as an IV for English proficiency, but admit that 
“age at arrival probably affects immigrant earnings through channels other than 
language”. For example, younger arrivers may face lower costs of assimilation that are 
unrelated to language. 
An alternative to the IV approach, as proposed by Manski and Pepper (2000), is to use a 
monotone instrumental variable (MIV), which is a weaker, but often more credible 
assumption.
25 An MIV (in the sense of mean-monotonicity) is assumed to satisfy the 
following: 
u2 > u 1 ﬁ  E[y(t)|x,v=u2] ‡ E[y(t)|x,v=u1],              (10)   
                                                 
25 Note that MTS is just a special case, where the MIV coincides with the treatment variable. Analogously, 
ETS can be considered a special case of IV.   17 
I propose using age at arrival in the US as a monotone instrumental variable. Taking age as 
arrival as an MIV is equivalent to assuming that immigrants who arrived in the US at a 
younger age have weakly higher wage functions than those who arrived later, which can be 
attributed to lower costs of assimilation.
26 The choice of instrument is based on research on 
language acquisition that shows than younger children tend to learn languages more easily 
than adolescents and adults.
27  
This assumption gives us new bounds on E[y(t)] (see table 4), according to the 
following expression:
28 
Su˛V  P(v=u) {supu1£u (E[y(t)|v=u1, z=t] P(z=t|v=u1) + K0 P(z„t|v=u1))}  £     
E[y(t)]  £                     (11) 
Su˛V  P(v=u) {infu2‡u (E[y(t)|v=u2, z=t] P(z=t|v=u2) + K1 P(z„t|v=u2))}    
   
3.2.3 Combining Assumptions on Treatment Response and Selection 
It seems reasonable to impose at the same time that the response function is monotone and 
that selection into treatments is positive, assumptions that are both consistent with 
conventional theories of human capital accumulation. In addition to shrinking the 
identification region, once we impose MTR together with MTS, we eliminate  1 0,K K  from 
the equation, i.e., we do not need to restrict the range of the outcome variables. 
Assuming both MTR and MTS yields the following formula (that can be derived 
starting from (5) and adding the restrictions implied by (7)) for the bounds on earnings: 
                                                 
26 The MIV used is discrete and takes four possible values: US-born, arrived as a child (0 to 11 years old), 
arrived as a teenager (12 to 17 years old), and arrived as an adult (18 or older). 
27 See Bleakley and Chin 2002. 
28 Again, see Manski and Pepper (2000) for the original derivation of this formula.    18 
Su<t E[y(u)|z=u] P(z=t) + E[y(t)|z=t] P(z ‡ t)  £  E[y(t)]  £        (12) 
Su>t E[y(u)|z=u] P(z=u) + E[y(t)|z=t] P(z £ t)    
               
The initial worst-case bounds are now considerably reduced. Expected wage lies between 
1.67 and 1.98 if we assign treatment t1 to the whole population, while it lies between 1.97 
and 2.05 if treatment t4 is assigned (see figure 1).  
  As for unemployment, imposing MTR+MTS yields the result that a worker who doesn’t 
speak English at all faces an unemployment rate between 10.2 and 15.8, while this rate 
ranges from 9.3 to 10.4 for a worker who speaks English very well (see figure 2).  
  We can shrink  the MTR+MTS bounds for wages further if we add the monotone 
instrumental variable as defined in the previous section. The n ew bounds can be seen in 
table 4 (see also figure 3).  
3.2.4 Average Treatment Effects 
The “average treatment effect” (henceforth, ATE) is defined simply as E[y(ti)] – E[y(tj)]. 
The bounds derived for individual expectations imply bounds on the differences. We are 
interested in gains in expected wage (and expected probability of being unemployed) when 
moving from one treatment to the next, because this provides a sense of the gains derived 
from “investing in language acquisition”. I will pay attention to ATE for ti to ti+1; and also 
for t1 to t4 and t1 to t5. These last two quantities give an idea of the global penalty derived 
from moving from no English proficiency at all to a perfect knowledge of the language.29 
                                                 
29 I consider it more reasonable to focus on t1 to t4. While it is in theory possible for someone to move from 
treatment t1 to t4 in a relatively short period of time, it is not reasonable to assume that someone can easily 
reach perfect fluency (equivalent to someone who speaks only English at home) starting from zero.    19 
The bounds for the ATEs for wages and the bootstrap confidence intervals are 
presented in table 3. In order to give an idea of the magnitudes, I graph the bounds for 
E[y(t4)] – E[y(t1)] implied by the assumptions explored in this section (see figure 4). Note 
that, since y belongs to [1, 5], the ATE could in principle range from –4 to 4.
30 The worst-
case bounds imply that the ATE(t1-t4) could be anywhere between -3.34 and 2.74. When we 
assume MTR+MTS, the worst-case bound is narrowed down to [0, 0.385], i.e., the global 
wage penalty imposed by LEP is somewhere between 0 and 38.5 percent.31 Most of the 
studies on the subject report estimates of this magnitude (usually ranging from 15 to 35%). 
Assuming exogenous selection (see table 3), on the other hand, implies that the wage 
penalty from t 1 to t4 amounts to 37.8 percent. This estimate is slightly lower than the upper 
bound when assuming MTR+MTS.
32 When we add the MIV to the MTR+MTS 
assumptions, the upper bound remains unchanged, but the lower bound is now greater than 
zero (see table 4). Thus the combination of these three weak assumptions allows us to 
conclude that the overall wage penalty to LEP lies between 3.8 and 38.5 percent. If we use 
t5 instead of t4 as our measure of perfect fluency, then the overall penalty lies between 8.4 
and 41.6 percent. 
It is also informative to look at the average treatment effects for MTR+MTS from one 
treatment to the next. We observe that the maximum wage gains vary considerably along 
the treatments, although the lower bound (LB) is always zero. The upper bounds (UB) 
                                                 
30 See footnote 31 for the bounds obtained by using alternative values of [K0, K1]. 
31 Note that assuming MTR immediately implies that the lower bound cannot be lower than zero (although it 
could be higher). 
32 See Appendix for a generalization of this result.   20 
corresponding to moving from treatment t1 to t2 (32.2%), and t2 to t3 (22.3%) are quite high. 
However, we can rule out large effects of improving EP at the higher levels of fluency: 
moving from speaking English well to very well (from very well to perfect fluency) has an 
effect of at most 12.6% (11.2%) on wages. 
  The ATEs for unemployment are shown in figure 5. If we assume MTR+MTS, the 
penalty imposed to lack of EP (ATE(4-1)) amounts to between 0 and 6.46 unemployment 
points. Alternatively, assuming ETS yields an estimate of 6.3. Unemployment rates can 
thus be between zero and 6.5 points higher for non-English speakers than for those 
Hispanics who are fluent in English. Moving from t 1 to t2 can decrease the probability of 
unemployment by at most 5.8 points. The upper bounds are 2.3 points for t2 to t3, 1.5 for t3 
to t4, and 1.8 for t4 to t5. Again, large effects can be ruled out at the later stages of language 
acquisition.  
  Note that the results for wages reported so far have assumed that E[y(t)] is bounded 
between [K0,K1] = [1,5]. This is of course somewhat arbitrary, thus I have also explored 
how the bounds change with alternative values of [K0, K 1].
33 This sensitivity analysis is 
unnecessary for the MTR+MTS bounds since they are not a function of [K0, K1]. It is also 
unnecessary for the unemployment outcome since E[u(t)] is naturally bounded between 0 
and 1.  
 
                                                 
33 I perform a sensitivity analysis by using 0, 0.5 and 1 as possible values for K0, and 4, 4.5, 5, 5.5 and 6 for 
K1. The worst-case bounds always reduce the possible range of ATE(4-1) by 26%. The bounds under MTR 
reduce the worst-case bounds by 54 to 65%, depending on the values of [K0, K1], and the MTS bounds reduce 
the worst-case range by 30 to 43%.    21 
3.2.5  Introducing Covariates  
So far I did not condition on any covariates when I calculated the bounds, i.e., I treated the 
effect of EP as constant across all individuals. In this section I explore how the penalties 
imposed by LEP may vary across individuals.  
Education   
Previous research (McManus et al. 1983, Carliner 1996, Mora and Davila 1998) suggests 
that the wage penalty due to LEP increases with education. For Carliner (1996), education 
“is associated with both lower costs and greater benefits to learning English”. This is the 
reason why “the wage premium for speaking English well rises with education”. In table 7, 
we can see the values for the bounds on log wages for each of the treatments and the 
different assumptions considered in the previous subsections, conditioning on three 
different levels of education. Under ETS, the wage penalty does seem to increase with 
education: from 9.5 percent for high school dropouts to 45 percent for college attendants. 
However, once we impose more conservative assumptions, this claim is not sustained. 
Under MTR+MTS, we cannot reject zero effects for all education levels. Thus, the results 
reported in the literature may be due simply to higher ability bias in higher educational 
levels. 
  Manski and Pepper (2000) show that the joint MTR+MTS assumption is a testable 
hypothesis, which should be rejected if E[y(t)|z=t] is not weakly increasing in t.
34 The 
MTR+MTS hypothesis is rejected at the 95% confidence level for the lower education 
                                                 
34 See Appendix for a formalization of this monotonicity condition.   22 
category (less than a high school diploma), but not for the other two levels.
35 Under the 
human capital approach to language acquisition, we rule out the possibility that improving 
someone’s EP (everything else the same) can lead to decreasing wages. Thus, if the joint 
MTR+MTS assumption is rejected, we can reasonably conclude that the assumption that is 
failing to hold is the one about sorting (MTS). This suggests the presence of negative 
ability bias in the group of low educated workers: workers who speak English well have 
higher mean wage functions (are more skilled) than workers who speak very well, at low 
levels of education. This possibility has not been suggested in the previous literature.
36 
  Interestingly, the results point to the same direction for the unemployment outcome. 
Assuming ETS suggests returns to EP that increase with education. However, we can also 
reject the joint MTR+MTS assumption at the 95% confidence level for workers with less 
than a high school degree, but not for the rest of the categories.  
Country of Birth and Years of Residence in the US 
I now consider the returns to EP for US-born Hispanics versus immigrants. ETS suggests 
higher returns to EP for immigrants, both in terms o f wages and unemployment rates. 
However, zero is a lower bound for both immigrants and US-born once we impose 
MTR+MTS, and the data are consistent with the actual returns to EP being the same for 
both groups. This could happen if the ability bias was stronger in the immigrant group. We 
                                                 
35 I compute a 95% confidence band for the estimates of E[y(t)|z,s1] and find that no increasing function can 
be fit within the band. 
36 Of course, without further prior information, we cannot rule out a different explanation for this result: that 
increasing EP leads to decreasing wages for low educated workers. However, I find the story about selection 
more compelling.      23 
cannot reject the joint MTR+MTS assumption in any of the two categories, for either wages 
or unemployment. 
  The bounds for immigrants are however reduced once we use age at arrival as an MIV. 
Under the MTR, MTS and MIV assumptions combined, the overall effect of LEP on wages 
for Hispanic immigrants is bounded between 6 and 43 percent (ATE(1-5)). When I restrict 
the analysis to workers no older than 45, then the overall effect is between 10.2 and 41.3 
percent.   
  I also analyze the returns to EP for immigrants by years of residence in the US. Again, 
assuming exogenous selection would lead us to conclude that the return to EP in terms of 
wages is much higher (60.6 percent) for long-term immigrants (more than 20 years in then 
US) than for recent ones (24 percent for those who arrived in the US during the previous 10 
years). However, assuming MTR+MTS yields bounds that include zero effects for all three 
categories (see table 8). Moreover, MTR+MTS is rejected at the 95% confidence level for 
immigrants that arrived in the US during the previous 20 years, but not for the longer-term 
ones. Thus, without further information about sorting, we cannot support the hypothesis 
that the returns to EP for immigrants increase with time spent in the US. Previous studies 
that point to this result are relying on ETS, which seems inadequate in this setting. The 
patterns are again surprisingly similar for the unemployment outcome. ETS suggests 
increasing penalties to LEP with time spent in the US. However, this may be due to 
positive ability bias being present in the category of long-term immigrants, a hypothesis 
that is rejected for the recent immigrants' category. 
   24 
Occupation 
Different occupations are extremely heterogeneous in their use of language. T hus, the 
reduction in productivity implied by a lack of EP may vary across different jobs. Here I 
analyze the interaction between EP, occupations, wages and unemployment. I divide all 
occupations into six groups (see table 9).
37 The occupations with the highest average wage 
are managerial and repair. The lowest wages correspond to agriculture and services. The 
goal is to find out how the wage penalty due to LEP varies across occupations. Assuming 
ETS, the average treatment effect from t1 to t4 and t1 to t5 is varies largely with occupation 
(see table 9). Managerial and repair occupations show the highest penalties from t 1 to t4 
(62.4% and 40.2%, respectively), while the lowest values are attained in agricultural and 
service occupations (6.8% and 17.8%). However, this may be due to different degrees of 
selection across occupations. We can test for the joint MTR+MTS assumption by 
occupation. Although there are some dips, we cannot reject MTR+MTS for any of the 
occupational categories at the 95% confidence level. Thus, we can rule out large effects of 
LEP for certain occupations, such as agriculture and services (MTR+MTS upper bounds of 
6.7 and 17.4 percent, respectively). The bounds are wider for the rest. 
  A similar story can be applied to the analysis of EP and unemployment by occupation 
(see table 10). The ATE from t 1 to t 4 derived from imposing ETS is very high for 
managerial occupations with 59 points (!), followed by technical with 7.6 points. The 
lowest penalties (0.0, 0.0 and 0.3 percentage points) correspond to service, operators and 
                                                 
37 Excluding military occupations and "not classified".   25 
agricultural occupations. Repair occupations seem to be in the middle, with an ETS 
estimate of 1.5 points.  
  We can reject the joint MTR+MTS assumption only for service occupations. Thus, we 
can conclude that the probability o f finding a job is barely affected by LEP for agricultural 
workers and operators (MTR+MTS upper bounds of 0.3 and 0.2 percentage points), while 
the bounds are wider for the rest of the occupations. 
  I also study other covariates such as potential experience, ancestry, state of residence 
and gender (see table 8). The bounds on wages under MTR+MTS are similar for men and 
women, while in the case of unemployment, large effects can be ruled out for men, but not 
for women (upper bounds of 3.42 and 11.39 points,  respectively). The joint MTR+MTS 
assumption cannot be rejected for either men or women and both outcomes.
38  
One conclusion must be highlighted from this section. Assuming exogenous selection 
into treatments leads to estimates of the labor market penalties imposed by LEP that vary 
significantly across individuals. The higher returns to EP seem to correspond to highly 
educated workers and high skill occupations. This coincides with the results obtained by 
previous studies that use cross-section data, such as Mora and Davila (1998), and leads to 
viewing language proficiency as a complement of education, or of certain occupational 
skills. However, my results show that this conclusion is critically dependent on the 
maintained assumption of random assignment of treatments. If no prior information on 
sorting is available, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the returns to EP are the same 
                                                 
38 Note that the upper bound under MTR+MTS is 0.386 for the whole sample, and 0.426 when excluding 
women from the sample.   26 
across individuals, or even that they are all zero. I also show that the presence of positive 
selection can be tested if we accept the human capital approach to language acquisition. I 
find that positive selection can be rejected for certain categories, such as low educated 
workers and recent immigrants.
39   
 
3  Summary and Conclusions 
This paper studies the effect of limited English proficiency (LEP) on wages and 
employment opportunities for Hispanic workers in the United States. Imposing assumptions 
that are weaker but more credible than those implied by OLS or IV estimates, I find that, on 
average, LEP imposes an overall wage penalty that lies between 3.8 and 38.6 percent, and 
reduces the probability of finding a job by 0 to 6.5 percentage points. The estimates 
obtained assuming exogenous sorting (as in OLS) are 37.8 percent and 6.3 points, 
respectively, but there are strong reasons to believe that this assumption may not hold.  
Under exogenous sorting, previous studies (as well as my own analysis) have estimated 
returns to EP that vary with education, years of residence in the US, and occupation. 
However, my analysis reveals that strong (and often arbitrary) assumptions about sorting 
are required in order to support those results. Under MTS+MTR, we cannot reject that the 
returns to EP are the same for all levels of education or all occupations. We can, however, 
rule out large effects for low education levels and certain occupations.  
                                                 
39 Note that, if MTR+MTS is rejected and we think MTR always holds, then rejecting MTR+MTS also 
implies rejecting ETS.   27 
Under MTR+MTS, the increase in wage derived from improving English proficiency 
from “well” to “very well” is found to be no larger than 12.6 percent on average, while the 
reduction in the probability of being unemployed would be no larger than 1.5 percentage 
points. For workers with a high school degree and no college education, that increase in 
wage would amount to no more than 3.5 percent.  
Workers in agricultural occupations would experience a wage increase of no more than 
6.7% when improving their English proficiency from “not at all” to “very well”, and that 
would reduce their unemployment probability by no more than 0.3 percentage points. For 
service workers, the wage premium would be no higher than 17.4%, and the effect on the 
probability of not finding a job for operators would be no larger than 0.2 points.  
We can also reject the joint MTR+MTS assumption (and thus ETS) in some cases, 
suggesting the possibility of negative sorting for certain categories, such as recent 
immigrants and workers who did not graduate from high school.     
This study contributes to the literature on the returns to language skills by providing an 
identification region under weak but credible assumptions, so that any point estimates 
obtained under stronger assumptions should lie within these regions. I show that the 
combination of two weak but credible assumptions, monotone treatment response and 
monotone treatment selection, provides informative upper bounds on the returns to 
language skills for certain subgroups of the population, in the sense that those upper bounds 
are smaller than some of the point estimates reported in previous studies. When using age at 
arrival for immigrants as a monotone instrumental variable, I obtain lower bounds that are 
higher than zero.   28 
Appendix 
Relating The ETS Estimate To The MTR+MTS Bounds 
 
I here formalize the relationship between the ETS point estimate and the MTR+MTS 
bounds for the case of multiple (discrete) treatments. It is a common practice to use the 
OLS estimate as an approximation to the true value of an average treatment effect. If the 
researcher suspects that selection into treatments may not be just random, it is usual to 
informally use zero as a lower bound for the true ATE, and OLS as an upper bound (if the 
hypothesized selection is positive), although this is rarely made explicit. I here formalize 
what this informal practice implies for the case of two and more than two treatments, 
specifying the assumptions behind it. I will also show that, when the number of treatments 
is greater than two, the OLS estimate is in general not an upper bound for the ATE, except 
for the case of comparing the first treatment with the last.
40  
 
a) Binary treatment (t˛{0,1}). In this case, there's only one average treatment effect of 
interest: ATE1-0 = E[y(1)] - E[y(0)]. If we assume exogenous treatment selection,
41 then we 
obtain what I will call the OLS estimate, directly from equation (6):
42  
  ATE(1-0)OLS = E[y(1)|z=1] - E[y(0)|z=0].          (A1) 
Claim 1 : If we  assume instead  monotone treatment response  and monotone treatment 
selection (MTR+MTS),
43 then the bounds for the ATE are [0, OLS].  
Proof: Straightforward manipulation of equation (12). 
  Thus, for the case of two (mutually exclusive) treatments, using [0, OLS] as informal 
bounds for the ATE is equivalent to assuming that response is weakly increasing in t (i.e., 
yj(1)‡yj(0)), and that there is positive selection into treatment 1 (i.e., E[y(t)|z=1] 
                                                 
40 This section is an extension of the results presented in Manski and Pepper (2000), section 3.4.       
41 See section 3.2.2 for some discussion about what this assumption implies. 
42 OLS implies not only ETS, but also a linear response function. However, in the case of discrete treatment 
variables, OLS and ETS can be thought of as equivalent, each treatment being equivalent to a dummy variable 
in an OLS regression. Thus, the results presented in this section can be used to interpret the coefficients of a 
multivariate OLS regression with dummies for each of the treatments. 
43 See section 3.3 for a discussion of the combined MTR+MTS assumption.   29 
‡E[y(t)|z=0]). When the number of treatments is just two, MTR+MTS is a plausible 
assumption if and only if E[y(1)|z=1]  ‡ E[y(0)|z=0], i.e., if OLS1-0‡0. This is a particular 
case of the  monotonicity conditions specified in b). Thus, in the case of only two 
treatments, using [0, OLS] as informal bounds for the ATE is equivalent to assuming 
monotone response and monotone selection, instead of exogenous selection. 
 
b) More than two treatments. Suppose we have a treatment variable t, where t=1,2,…n, 
with n>2. Then, the number of average treatment effects of interest is ￿t=1
n-1
 t. In our 
particular application, English Proficiency can lie in 5 different categories; therefore there 
are 10 ATE’s of interest. 
Monotonicity conditions: 
The weak monotonicity condition is satisfied when E[y(t)|z=t] is weakly increasing in t.
44 
The strong monotonicity condition is satisfied when E[y(t)|z=t] is strictly increasing in t. 
Claim 2 : MTR+MTS is a plausible assumption if and only if the weak monotonicity 
condition holds (Manski and Pepper 2000, footnote 9). 
Note that, since in our particular application the hypothesized selection into treatments 
is positive, I will always mean "positive selection" when I say "monotone", i.e., if  i>j, then 
MTS will imply that E[y(i)|z=i]‡E[y(i)|z=j].  
Under the assumption of ETS, E[y(t)] = E[y(t)|z=t] (see equation (6)). Thus, the ATE 
from treatment a to b is just:      
ATE(a-b)OLS =  E[y(a)|z=a] - E[y(b)|z=b]          (A2)   
Under MTR+MTS, E[y(t)] lies within the bounds shown in equation (3.13). From there we 
can easily derive the lower and upper bound (LB and UB) for the ATE(a-b) under the 
MTR+MTS assumption:
45 
LB = Max { 0 ,  Su<a  E[y(u)|z=u] P(z=u) + E[y(a)|z=a] P(z>a) –   (A3) 
                                                 
44 This condition is equivalent to Equation (19) in Manski and Pepper (2000). 
45 See Manski and Pepper (2000).   30 
Su>b  E[y(u)|z=u] P(z=u) - E[y(b)|z=b] P(z6b) }           
UB = Su>a E[y(u)|z=u] P(z=u) + E[y(a)|z=a] P(z6a) –       (A4) 
Su<b E[y(u)|z=u] P(z=u) - E[y(b)|z=b] P(z>b)           
For the sake of concision, we will from now on use the following notation: Ei ” E[y(i)|z=i], 
and Pi ” P(z=i). 
Claim 3: If t is a treatment variable, where t=1,2,…n, with n>2, then the following is true 
for the average treatment effects ATE(a-b), where a, b are any two treatments, a>b: 
i) The bounds derived from imposing MTR+MTS take the following values: 
If  Eb Si=1
b Pi - Ea Si=a
n Pi > Si=1
b Ei Pi - Si=a
n Ei Pi  ,  then LB=0 and UB>OLS 
If  Eb Si=1
b Pi - Ea Si=a
n Pi = Si=1
b Ei Pi -  Si=a
n Ei Pi  ,  then LB=0 and UB=OLS 
If  Eb Si=1
b Pi - Ea Si=a
n Pi < Si=1
b Ei Pi -  Si=a
n Ei Pi  ,  then LB>0 and UB<OLS 
ii) If the weak monotonicity condition holds, then LB=0 and UB>OLS.
46 
Proof: Straightforward manipulation of (A2), (A3) and (A4). 
Special cases: 
ATE(n-k), k<n  (from any treatment to treatment n): The bounds derived from imposing 
MTR+MTS take the following values: 
If  Ek Si=1
k Pi > Si=1
k Ei Pi  ,  then LB=0 and UB>OLS 
If  Ek Si=1
k Pi = Si=1
k Ei Pi  ,  then LB=0 and UB=OLS 
If  Ek Si=1
k Pi < Si=1
k Ei Pi  ,  then LB>0 and UB<OLS 
If the strong monotonicity condition holds, then LB=0 and UB>OLS.  
ATE(k-1), k>1  (from treatment 1 to any treatment):  The bounds derived from imposing 
MTR+MTS take the following values: 
                                                 
46 Claim 3 ii) follows directly from equations (19) and (23) in Manski and Pepper (2000) and is in fact 
informally stated there (p. 1005).   31 
If  Ek Si=k
n Pi < Si=k
n Ei Pi ,  then LB=0 and UB>OLS 
If  Ek Si=k
n Pi = Si=k
n Ei Pi ,  then LB=0 and UB=OLS 
If  Ek Si=k
n Pi < Si=k
n Ei Pi ,  then LB>0 and UB<OLS 
If the strong monotonicity condition holds, then LB=0 and UB>OLS.  
Corollary 1: For ATE(n-1), it is always the case that LB=0 and UB=OLS.  
Corollary 2: For ATE(n-2), LB=0 and UB>(=)OLS iff E2<(=)E1. 
Corollary 3: For ATE((n-1)-1), LB=0 and UB>(=)OLS iff En>(=)En-1. 
For example, in the EP application for wages, when assuming MTR+MTS, ATE(4-1) is 
bounded between zero and an UB higher than the OLS estimate, since E[y(5)|z=5] > 
E[y(4)|z=4], i.e., average observed wages are higher for workers with assigned treatment 5 
than for those with assigned treatment 4.   
  Thus, we can conclude that: 
￿  Under MTR+MTS, UB=OLS only in the following special cases: 
i)  Binary treatment. 
ii)  More than two treatments, ATE(n-1). 
iii) More than two treatments, ATE(a-b) for any a>b, if (and only if):   
Eb Si=1
b Pi - Ea Si=a
n Pi = Si=1
b Ei Pi -  Si=a
n Ei Pi 
￿  If the weak monotonicity condition holds (and this is necessary for MTR+MTS to be a 
plausible assumption), then for any ATE(a-b), a>b, it is the case that LB=0, and 
UB>OLS (>OLS if the strong monotonicity condition holds). 
￿  If the monotonicity condition does not hold, then we can have cases where LB>0 and 
UB<OLS. 
Thus, in cases where the treatment variable is discrete and non-binary, the OLS estimates 
will in general be interior to the MTR+MTS bounds, except for the specific ATE from the 
first treatment to the last, and as long as the weak monotonicity condition holds.   32 
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Figure 3. MTR+MTS plus age at arrival as MIV (Wages) 
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)Table 1. English Proficiency and Average Earnings 
Treatment  1  2  3  4  5  Totals 
N. observations  5701  12175  14674  33725  15975  82250 
% total 
observations 
0.0693  0.1480  0.1784  0.4100  0.1942  1.00 
Average log wage  1.6658  1.8097  1.9706  2.0440  2.0822  1.9774 
Standard deviation  0.6831  0.6625  0.6993  0.7217  0.7505  0.7240 
Average education  6.0171  7.9532  10.2220  11.9017  12.3149  10.6899 
Average experience  22.9368  21.4180  19.4431  15.2730  13.3314  17.0807 
% Born outside 
U.S. 
0.9970  0.9747  0.8947  0.4890  0.6446  0.6987 
% Mexican-
American 
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      Table 2. English Proficiency and Unemployment 
 
 Treatment  1  2  3  4  5 
Employed  5379  11551  13649  30867  14472 
Unemployed  1006  1511  1547  3227  1355 
Out labor force  3785  5406  6064  12780  5399 
TOTAL  10170  18468  21260  46874  21226 
Unemp. Rate  0.158  0.116  0.102  0.095  0.086 
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Table 3. Bounds for Wages 
 
Assumptions   ETS  95% confidence int.  Worst-case  95% conf. int.   
            LB  UB  LB  UB   
E[y(t1)]  1.6658  1.648  1.6835  1.0461  4.7689  1.0444  4.7745   
E[y(t2)]  1.8097  1.7974  1.821  1.1199  4.5278  1.1171  4.5348   
E[y(t3)]  1.9706  1.9592  1.9815  1.1732  4.4595  1.1699  4.4677   
E[y(t4)]  2.044  2.0363  2.0513  1.4281  3.788  1.4237  3.798   
E[y(t5)]  2.0822  2.0708  2.094  1.2102  4.4333  1.2062  4.4412   
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  0.0382  0.0245  0.0523  -2.5778  3.0052  -2.5871  3.0132   
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  0.0734  0.0591  0.0874  -3.0315  2.6148  -3.04  2.6246   
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  0.1609  0.1434  0.1767  -3.3546  3.3397  -3.3622  3.348   
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  0.1439  0.1227  0.165  -3.649  3.4816  -3.6549  3.4887   
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  0.3782  0.3584  0.3978  -3.3408  2.7418  -3.3476  2.7519   
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t1)]  0.4164  0.395  0.4376  -3.5587  3.3871  -3.5653  3.3952   
 
                 
Assumptions   MTR  95% conf. int.  MTS  95% conf. int. 
  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB 
E[y(t1)]  1.0461  1.9774  1.0444  1.9822  1.6658  4.7689  1.6474  4.7748 
E[y(t2)]  1.166  2.2085  1.1629  2.2155  1.7536  4.3066  1.7426  4.3154 
E[y(t3)]  1.3392  2.6808  1.3349  2.6901  1.7597  3.8011  1.7506  3.8117 
E[y(t4)]  1.7672  3.2212  1.7619  3.2319  1.6308  2.6181  1.6247  2.6279 
E[y(t5)]  1.9774  4.4333  1.9725  4.4413  1.2102  2.0822  1.2063  2.094 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  0  2.6661  0  2.6733  -1.4079  0.4514  -1.4163  0.4643 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  0  1.8821  0  1.8907  -2.1703  0.8585  -2.1793  0.8716 
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  0  1.5148  0  1.5228  -2.547  2.0476  -2.5587  2.0626 
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  0  1.1624  0  1.1683  -3.0153  2.6408  -3.0276  2.6608 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  0  2.1751  0  2.1855  -3.1381  0.9523  -3.1455  0.9721 
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Table 3. Continued 
Assumptions   MTR+MTS  95% conf. int. 
  LB  UB  LB  UB 
E[y(t1)]  1.6658  1.9774  1.6474  1.9822 
E[y(t2)]  1.7997  1.9874  1.7885  1.9922 
E[y(t3)]  1.9257  2.0224  1.9165  2.0283 
E[y(t4)]  1.97  2.0514  1.9644  2.0578 
E[y(t5)]  1.9774  2.0822  1.9725  2.094 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  0  0.1122  0  0.1251 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  0  0.1258  0  0.1364 
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  0  0.2226  0  0.2349 
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  0  0.3216  0  0.3392 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  0  0.3856  0  0.4036 
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Table 4. Bounds for Wages under Age at Arrival as an MIV 
Assumptions   MIV  MTR+MIV  MTR+MTS+MIV 
  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB 
E[y(t1)]  1,0461  4,4440  1,0461  1,9322  1,6658  1,9322 
E[y(t2)]  1,1199  3,9857  1,1660  2,2085  1,7997  1,9874 
E[y(t3)]  1,1732  4,1963  1,3392  2,6808  1,9257  2,0224 
E[y(t4)]  1,6253  3,5102  1,7672  3,2212  1,9700  2,0514 
E[y(t5)]  1,3842  4,4333  2,0159  4,4333  2,0159  2,0822 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  0,0000  2,9395  0,0000  1,1624  0,0000  0,3217 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  0,0000  3,0764  0,0000  1,5148  0,0000  0,2226 
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  0,0000  2,3370  0,0000  1,8821  0,0000  0,1257 
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  0,0000  2,8080  0,0000  2,6661  0,0000  0,1122 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  0,0000  2,4640  0,0000  2,1751  0,0378  0,3857 
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Table 5. Bounds for Unemployment Rates 
 
Assumptions   ETS  95% confidence int.  Worst-case  95% confidence int.   
            LB  UB         
E[y(t1)]  0.1576  0.1486  0.1665  0.0119  0.9364  0.0112  0.9382   
E[y(t2)]  0.1157  0.1104  0.1207  0.0179  0.8634  0.017  0.8655   
E[y(t3)]  0.1018  0.0969  0.1065  0.0183  0.8386  0.0174  0.8409   
E[y(t4)]  0.0947  0.0914  0.0978  0.0382  0.635  0.0368  0.6379   
E[y(t5)]  0.0856  0.0814  0.0901  0.016  0.8289  0.0152  0.8313   
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  -0.009  -0.0143  -0.0036  -0.619  0.7907  -0.6221  0.7934   
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  -0.0072  -0.0125  -0.0016  -0.8004  0.6167  -0.8031  0.6198   
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  -0.0139  -0.0212  -0.0067  -0.8451  0.8207  -0.8475  0.8231   
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  -0.0419  -0.0525  -0.0318  -0.9185  0.8515  -0.9204  0.8537   
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  -0.0629  -0.0725  -0.0534  -0.8982  0.6231  -0.9004  0.6263   
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t1)]  -0.0719  -0.0816  -0.0619  -0.9204  0.817  -0.9222  0.8197   
                 
Assumptions   MTR  95% confidence int.  MTS  95% confidence int. 
  LB  UB        LB  UB     
E[y(t1)]  0.1022  0.9364  0.1002  0.9382  0.0119  0.1576  0.0112  0.1665 
E[y(t2)]  0.0903  0.7998  0.0885  0.8024  0.0266  0.1824  0.0253  0.1873 
E[y(t3)]  0.0725  0.6384  0.0707  0.6415  0.0417  0.3084  0.0397  0.3127 
E[y(t4)]  0.0542  0.2734  0.0527  0.2763  0.0769  0.4655  0.0743  0.469 
E[y(t5)]  0.016  0.1022  0.0152  0.1042  0.0856  0.8289  0.0814  0.8313 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  -0.2574  0  -0.2601  0  -0.3799  0.7519  -0.3856  0.7553 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  -0.5842  0  -0.5875  0  -0.2314  0.4238  -0.2362  0.4278 
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  -0.7273  0  -0.7301  0  -0.1407  0.2818  -0.1461  0.2858 
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  -0.846  0  -0.8485  0  -0.131  0.1706  -0.14  0.1754 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  -0.8822  0  -0.8844  0  -0.0806  0.4536  -0.0901  0.4572 







   41 
 
Table 5. Continued 
Assumptions  MTR+MTS  95% confidence int. 
  LB  UB     
E[y(t1)]  0.1022  0.1576  0.1002  0.1665 
E[y(t2)]  0.0991  0.1188  0.0971  0.1236 
E[y(t3)]  0.0959  0.1082  0.0933  0.112 
E[y(t4)]  0.093  0.1039  0.0902  0.1064 
E[y(t5)]  0.0856  0.1022  0.0814  0.1042 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  -0.0183  0  -0.0231  0 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  -0.0152  0  -0.0197  0 
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  -0.023  0  -0.0287  0 
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  -0.0585  0  -0.0676  0 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  -0.0646  0  -0.0738  0 
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Table 6. Summary Linear Regressions for Hourly Wage 
  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t 
Intercept  1.67  [176.24]  1.44  [140.12]  0.98  [77.51]  0.96  [66.66] 
Dummy EP=2  0.14  [12.57]  0.07  [6.25]  0.03  [2.71]  0.03  [3.05] 
Dummy EP=3  0.30  [27.37]  0.15  [12.87]  0.08  [7.42]  0.08  [6.93] 
Dummy EP=4  0.38  [37.01]  0.16  [14.33]  0.15  [13.65]  0.13  [11.33] 
Dummy EP=5  0.42  [37.83]  0.18  [15.24]  0.22  [17.81]  0.19  [15.51] 
Education      0.04  [52.05]  0.06  [78.01]  0.05  [58.52] 
Experience          0.02  [70.58]  0.01  [65.95] 
US born          0.01  [1.47]  0.00  [0.34] 
Years Res.          0.00  [13.17]  0.00  [11.67] 
Gender          -0.23  [-49.15]  -0.23  [-46.00] 
CA+TX+NM          0.02  [3.33]  0.01  [1.69] 
P.Rican          0.09  [9.23]  0.08  [8.41] 
Cuban          0.05  [4.71]  0.02  [2.21] 
Spaniard          0.07  [3.97]  0.05  [2.88] 
Central Am.          0.01  [1.35]  0.01  [1.01] 
South Am.           0.05  [4.39]  0.04  [3.49] 
Other non-mex.          0.00  [-0.24]  -0.01  [-0.93] 
Managerial              0.47  [37.09] 
Technical              0.24  [20.57] 
Service              0.03  [2.83] 
Repair              0.30  [25.96] 
Operators              0.17  [16.01] 
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Table 7. Bounds on Wages Conditioning on Education 
 
Assumption   ETS  Worst-case  MTR  MTS  MTR+MTS 
Less than a high 
shool degree 
  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  -0.0667  -2.9871  3.4168  0.000  2.9417  -1.0695  0.4196  0.000  -0.0555 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  -0.0803  -3.0965  2.8754  0.000  2.2446  -1.8078  0.6029  0.000  -0.0279 
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  0.1055  -3.0064  3.1376  0.000  1.7686  -2.2110  1.4541  0.000  0.0850 
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  0.1363  -3.3451  3.1083  0.000  1.1613  -2.8642  2.1089  0.000  0.1619 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  0.1615  -3.3040  2.9774  0.000  2.6310  -3.2180  0.5008  0.000  0.1544 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t1)]  0.0948  -3.4619  3.5649  0.000  3.5649  -3.4619  0.0948  0.000  0.0948 
                   
   ETS  Worst-case  MTR  MTS  MTR+MTS 
Just a high school 
degree 
  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  0.0522  -2.3248  2.8147  0.000  2.5522  -1.4682  0.3350  0.000  0.0725 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  0.0031  -3.0076  2.4060  0.000  1.5997  -2.4324  0.8416  0.000  0.0352 
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  0.1608  -3.5470  3.4037  0.000  1.2487  -2.7677  2.3322  0.000  0.1772 
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  0.0702  -3.8535  3.7018  0.000  1.0411  -3.1167  2.8887  0.000  0.2280 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  0.2341  -3.4574  2.5608  0.000  1.8451  -3.2169  0.9625  0.000  0.2467 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t1)]  0.2863  -3.6738  3.2671  0.000  3.2671  -3.6738  0.2863  0.000  0.2863 
           
   ETS  Worst-case  MTR  MTS  MTR+MTS 
Some college    LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB 
E[y(t5)]-E[y(t4)]  0.0254  -2.2027  2.5801  0.000  2.3710  -1.6665  0.2719  0.000  0.0629 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t3)]  0.1265  -2.9596  2.4120  0.000  1.5941  -2.4257  0.9642  0.000  0.1463 
E[y(t3)]-E[y(t2)]  0.1786  -3.6908  3.5708  0.000  1.3648  -2.7454  2.4949  0.000  0.2888 
E[y(t2)]-E[y(t1)]  0.1235  -3.9149  3.8315  0.000  1.2554  -3.0207  2.9757  0.000  0.3996 
E[y(t4)]-E[y(t1)]  0.4286  -3.3037  2.5527  0.000  1.7939  -2.9516  1.1945  0.000  0.4357 
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Table 8. Bounds on Wages for Some Covariates (ATE 4-1) 
 
 Assumptions    ETS  MTR  MTS  MTR+MTS 
         LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB 
 Years of   
residence 
< 10 years  0.2433  0.00  3.1331  -3.0890  0.3433  0.00  0.2412 
  10-20  0.2748  0.00  2.7667  -3.3166  0.4026  0.00  0.2732 
   > 20  0.6062  0.00  2.4623  -3.1134  0.8261  0.00  0.6079 
 Gender  Male  0.4151  0.00  2.2650  -3.1255  0.9785  0.00  0.4262 
   Female  0.3557  0.00  1.8927  -3.1763  1.0174  0.00  0.3583 
 Ancestry  Mexican  0.3419  0.00  2.2018  -3.1494  0.9037  0.00  0.3549 
  Puerto Rican  0.2454  0.00  1.9296  -3.1166  0.7146  0.00  0.2399 
  Cuban  0.4370  0.00  2.4512  -3.0624  0.7036  0.00  0.4405 
  Central Am.  0.3969  0.00  2.8622  -3.1897  0.5822  0.00  0.3987 
  South Am.  0.3282  0.00  2.5251  -3.2644  0.6134  0.00  0.3283 
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    Table 9. Wage Penalty Across Occupations under ETS 
 
ATE   E(w/t2)-E(w/t1)  E(w/t3)-E(w/t2)  E(w/t4)-E(w/t3) 
1.Managerial  0.3309  0.1183  0.1748 
2.Technical   0.1068  0.1083  0.0398 
3.Service   0.0764  0.0907  0.0114 
4.Agriculture   0.0699  0.0611  -0.063 
5.Repair   0.1712  0.191  0.0399 
6.Operators  0.1573  0.1501  -0.0135 
       
ATE   E(w/t5)-E(w/t4)  E(w/t4)-E(w/t1)  E(w/t5)-E(w/t1) 
1.Managerial  0.048  0.6241  0.672 
2.Technical   0.0494  0.2548  0.3043 
3.Service   -0.0285  0.1785  0.15 
4.Agriculture   -0.0109  0.0679  0.057 
5.Repair   0.0764  0.4021  0.4785 
6.Operators  0.0096  0.294  0.3036 
 
Note: The occupational groups are defined as follows: 
1. Managerial and professional specialty occupations. 
2. Technical, sales, and administrative support occupations (technicians of all kinds, sales 
workers, secretaries, etc). 
3. Service occupations. 
4. Agricultural and related occupations (farmers, gardeners, fishers, hunters, etc). 
5. Precision production, craft, and repair occupations. 
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Table 10. Observed Unemployment Rates by EP and Occupation 
 
Treatments  1  2  3  4  5  Total 
1. Managerial  0.686  0.352  0.142  0.092  0.078  0.125 
2. Technical  0.148  0.092  0.076  0.072  0.064  0.073 
3. Service  0.089  0.077  0.080  0.089  0.102  0.087 
4. Agricultural  0.164  0.146  0.158  0.161  0.161  0.157 
5. Repair  0.102  0.089  0.082  0.087  0.077  0.085 
6. Operators  0.117  0.101  0.107  0.117  0.100  0.109   47 
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